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COMPETITION LAW IN THAILAND: 
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
SAKDA THANITCUL 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. History  
Due to the rapid economic growth that occurred in Thailand from 1987 
to 1990,1 the economic structure in Thailand changed drastically.2 
Therefore, the Thai Ministry of Commerce (MOC) established a Working 
Committee consisting of MOC officials and university professors to 
examine whether the existing Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly Act of 
1979 (PFA) was still suitable for the economic structure that had gone 
through such a remarkable growth period.3 The Working Committee 
concluded that the PFA had two serious flaws.4 First, the primary 
objective of the PFA was to control the market prices of goods and 
services for the benefit of consumers, and its antimonopoly provisions 
only served as an additional measure of controlling prices.5 Second, in 
order to enforce the PFA’s antimonopoly provisions, it first was necessary 
to enforce the price fixing provisions.6 These two flaws created 
tremendous legal and political difficulties for the Thai Fair Trade 
Commission (TFTC) to enforce the PFA. In fact, since the enactment of 
the PFA, the enforcement agency has taken only one action against a price 
fixing cartel.7 
The author interviewed a number of high-ranking MOC officials and 
representatives of Thai businesses and there are conflicting views about 
who originally backed the current Thai Trade Competition Act (TCA). 
  Member, Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. 
 1. See THE WORLD BANK, TRENDS IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 1996, 491 (1996). 
 2. Pallop Rattanadara, Kodmai Karnkaenkan Tang Kanka Khong Pratettai [Thailand’s 
Competition Law], 12 CHULALONGKORN L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2000). 
 3. See Price Fixing and Anti-Monopoly Act of 1979 (Thail.), available at http://www.apeccp. 
org.tw/doc/Thailand/Competition/thcom02.html. 
 4. See Sutee Supanit, Economic Law Reform and Competition Policy, in LAW, JUSTICE AND 
OPEN SOCIETY IN ASEAN 301 (Piruna Tingsabadh ed., 1997). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. CHAIYOS HEMARAJATA, KAMATIBAY KODMAI WADAUY KARN KAMNODRAKASINKA LAE 
KARNPONGKANKARPOOKAD [COMMENTARY ON THE PRICE FIXING AND ANTI-MONOPOLY ACT OF 
1979] 169-71 (1994). 
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MOC officials insist that Thai officials initiated the idea of creating the 
TCA,8 but representatives of Thai industries believe the Thai government 
initiated it under pressure from the United States.9 The author learned from 
interviewing key members of the Working Committee that the Working 
Committee modeled substantial parts of the TCA after the South Korean 
Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA),10 the Taiwanese Fair 
Trade Law (FTL),11 the Japanese Antimonopoly Law of 1947,12 and the 
German Act Against Restraints of Competition.13 
B. Statutory Framework  
The Working Committee patterned the TCA largely after the antitrust 
statutes of more advanced market economies, particularly those of South 
Korea and Taiwan. The TCA reflects the Working Committee’s 
presumption that Thailand’s economic structure, where the majority of the 
domestic product markets are monopolistic or oligopolistic, is similar to 
South Korea’s.14 The TCA therefore focuses on eliminating unreasonable 
or anticompetitive pricing behavior from dominant firms rather than 
directly prohibiting monopolization or monopoly itself.15 
The structure of the Thai economy falls somewhere in-between South 
Korea’s economic structure, where thirty chaebols dominate the domestic 
market, and Taiwan’s, where 98% of firms are small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). The Thai economy is closer to the Taiwanese 
economy because (1) there are fewer market dominant firms in Thailand 
 8. See Rattanadara, supra note 2, at 21 (writing that the MOC had to push for the enactment of 
the TCA because Section 50 of the Thai Constitution required the government of Thailand to support 
and maintain the market economy). See also THAI CONSTITUTION, reprinted in Sompong Sucharitkul, 
Kingdom of Thailand, in 18 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 12 (Gisbert H. Flanz 
ed., 1998). 
 9. See Bodin Asavanich, Ensuring Compliance and Cooperation in Competition Law 
Enforcement 2 (Mar. 13, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
 10. See Dokjummit Gongjung Gurae Gwanhan Popryul [Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade 
Act], Law No. 6043, Dec. 28, 1999, available at http://www.moleg.go.kr/mlawinfo/english/ 
htms/html/law10.html. 
 11. The full text of the Fair Trade Law is available at http://www.ftc.gov.tw (last visited May 20, 
2002). 
 12. Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu [Act 
Concerning Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade], Act No. 54 of Apr. 14, 
1947 [hereinafter Antimonopoly Law], reprinted in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGI, THE 
ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS AND POLICIES OF JAPAN app. A, at 387 (1994). 
 13. See Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Act Against Restraints of Competition] 
(F.R.G.), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/GWB01-2002.pdf. 
 14. See Supanit, supra note 4, at 303. 
 15. See Rattanadara, supra note 2, at 22. 
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than in South Korea and (2) most of the Thai firms are SMEs.16 
Furthermore, unlike the South Korean government, the Thai government 
never has adopted nationalist economic policies to promote national 
champions. The hallmark of Thailand’s economic development is neo-
liberalism: trade and investment liberalization with few government 
industrial policies.17 
The myth about the similarity between the economic structures of 
South Korea and Thailand leads to an overemphasis on regulating the 
behavior of market-dominant firms and, consequently, an oversight of 
regulating the behavior (especially the unfair trade practices) of Thai 
SMEs.18 
C. Administration 
When a firm violates the TCA’s substantive provisions, the TFTC may 
issue a written order to the firm to suspend, stop, or correct its actions. In 
the order, the TFTC also may prescribe rules, procedures, conditions, and 
time restraints on compliance. 
The TFTC possesses almost exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the TCA. 
The Thai Ministry of Justice does not have a unit specifically charged with 
enforcing the antitrust laws, and although the District Attorney may 
prosecute violations of the TCA, such prosecution is contingent on a 
request by the TFTC.19 A firm that is unsatisfied with the decision of the 
TFTC may appeal to the Appellate Committee, whose ultimate decision is 
final. 
 16. See generally UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, THAILAND: 
COPING WITH THE STRAINS OF SUCCESS 66 (1992). Most Thai economists agree that more than 90% 
of all enterprises in Thailand are SMEs. See Suphat Suphachalasai et al., Karn Dumnoen Mattakarn 
Sanabsanoon SMEs Khong Yeepoon, Taiwan, Italy Lae Australia [Measures to Promote SMEs in 
Japan, Taiwan, Italy and Australia], 2001 INST. OF SOC. & ECON. POL’Y (Bangkok, Thail.) 1-1. 
 17. See SCOTT CHRISTENSEN ET AL., WORLD BANK, THE LESSONS OF EAST ASIA: THAILAND: 
THE INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF GROWTH 2-5 (1993). 
 18. This myth is evident in the policy goals of the TCA: 
The reasons for the promulgation of this Act are as follows: Whereas there has been a repeal 
of the existing law governing fixing of prices of goods and prevention of monopoly, which 
contains both the provisions of fixing of prices of goods and prevention of monopoly in the 
same law. It is appropriate to revise the rules concerning prevention of monopoly and to 
specifically enact a law governing trade competition so that there are systematic provisions 
regarding prevention of acts constituting monopoly, reduction or limitation of competition in 
business operations, which will promote the free operation of business and prevent unfair 
practice in business operations. 
See Remarks of the Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 (1999) (on file with the Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review). 
 19. See THAI CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE §§ 141-142 (1989). 
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There are several issues currently under debate in Thailand about 
judicial review of Appellate Committee decisions. First, is it legally 
permissible for an unsatisfied firm or business operator to bring the 
decision of the Appellate Committee to a court for judicial review? 
Second, which court—the court of justice or an administrative court—has 
jurisdiction to review the decision?20 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE LAW 
A. Relations with Competitors 
Public education about the objectives of the TCA conducted by the 
Department of Internal Trade (DIT) within the MOC has helped the Thai 
public to understand that the TCA will promote and maintain the process 
of fair and free market competition rather than the actual market 
competitors. In addition, the DIT emphasized that the TCA aims to 
regulate the anticompetitive behavior of business operators rather than the 
actual structure of the businesses. 
The Thai government always has tried to promote SMEs. However, its 
current promotional policy raises an important issue: how can the TFTC 
reconcile its promotion of SMEs with the TCA’s objective of maintaining 
a free and fair competitive process without paying attention to the SMEs 
being wiped out by larger competitors? 
B. Exemptions 
The TCA does not apply to acts of: 
(1)  A central, provincial, or local administration; 
(2)  State-owned enterprises regulated under the laws governing 
budgetary procedure; 
(3)  Farmer groups, co-operatives, or co-operative groups recognized 
by law and having business objectives for the benefit of farmers; 
 20. Thailand enacted the Act on the Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative 
Court Procedure B.E. 2542 in 1999. If the decision of the Appellate Committee is considered to be an 
“administrative order,” then it falls under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Courts. See Act on the 
Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure B.E. 2542 § 9(3) (1999) 
(Thail.), available at http://www.krisdika.go.th/law/text/lawpub/ee028/text.htm. 
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(4)  Businesses identified in the ministerial regulations, which may 
exempt the application of any or all provisions of the TCA.21 
Of the four exempted groups listed above, the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) are the most controversial. Large Thai firms opine that it is unfair 
that the TCA regulates their conduct22 but does not regulate the conduct of 
SOEs.23 Thailand’s SOEs are concentrated in natural monopolies (i.e. the 
electricity, telecommunications, and railroad industries) and gradually are 
being “privatized.”24 The current debate centers on whether these newly 
privatized firms should be placed under specific regulatory regimes similar 
to those in the United States and Europe or under the broad regulatory 
authority of the TCA. The current trend for the former SOEs doing 
business in the electricity, telecommunications, and railroad industries is 
to place them under specific regulatory regimes.25 
C. Abuse of a Dominant Position 
The TCA does not directly prohibit the possession or acquisition of 
monopoly power. However, it does proscribe unreasonable or 
anticompetitive behavior by large firms with substantial market shares. 
Section 25 of the TCA forbids "the abuse of a market dominant 
position.”26 Sections 3 and 8 of the TCA authorize the TFTC, with the 
approval of the Cabinet, to prescribe the market share and total sales above 
which a firm will be deemed a business operator with a market dominant 
position.27 The specific standard under the proposal that is currently 
awaiting Cabinet approval is a large firm with (1) more than a 33% market 
share, and (2) whose gross domestic sales total more than one billion Thai 
Baht (approximately US$22 million). The TFTC specifically identifies 
market dominant firms using these two criteria and then publishes the 
names of these firms in the Royal Gazette. Thus, Section 25 does not 
 21. Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 § 5 (1999) (Thail.). 
 22. Id. § 25. 
 23. See Deunden Nikomborirak, State-Owned Enterprises: The Last Bastion of Monopoly and 
the Greatest Challenge to Competition Authority 1-2 (Mar. 13, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with the Washington University Global Studies Law Review). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See The Royal Thai Government, Planmaebot Karnpatiroob Ratwisahakit [Master Plan for 
State Enterprise Reform], available at http://www.mof.go.th/sepc/sepcfnmenu.htm (last visited May 
20, 2002). See also Mitsuhiro Kagami, Privatization and Deregulation: The Case of Japan, in 
PRIVATIZATION, DEREGULATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ASIA, 
EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS 11-28 (Mitsuhiro Kagami & Masatsugu Tsuji eds., 2000). 
 26. Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 § 25 (1999) (Thail.). 
 27. See id. §§ 3, 8. 
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cover monopolistic behavior by an SME that does not fall within these 
criteria. However, unlike its model, the South Korean MRFTA, this 
behavior by Thai firms may not even fall within the category of unfair 
trade practices prohibited by Section 29. 
Any firm designated by the TFTC as a market dominant firm will 
receive scrutiny. The commission of the following conduct by a market-
dominant firm constitutes an abuse of its dominant position in violation of 
Section 25 of the TCA: 
(1)  unfairly fixing or maintaining the levels of sale or purchase prices 
of goods or services; 
(2)  setting conditions which, directly or indirectly, unfairly compel 
other business operators who are customers of the Business Operator 
to limit the provision of services, production, purchase or distribution 
of goods, or their opportunity to choose to buy or sell goods, accept or 
provide services, or obtain credit from other business operators; 
(3)  suspending, reducing, or limiting services, production, purchase, 
distribution, delivery, or importation into [Thailand] without 
reasonable grounds, or to destroy or damage goods in order to reduce 
supply to less than market demand; 
(4)  interfering with the business operations of other people without 
reasonable grounds.28 
The striking similarity between Section 25 of the TCA and Article 3 of 
the MRFTA29 reflects the fundamental presumption of the Thai Working 
Committee: the Thai economy is similar to the South Korean economy due 
to its monopolistic and oligopolistic markets. However, the Working 
Committee’s presumption was inaccurate, and it led to a wrong design of 
the TCA. 
D. Mergers and Other Business Combinations 
The Working Committee modeled Section 26 of the TCA after Article 
6(1) of the Taiwanese FTL.30 The purpose of Section 26 is to prevent the 
 28. Id. § 25. 
 29. See Seung Wha Chang, Korea, in WORLD ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE: A 
COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND BUSINESSES § 36.5 (James J. Garrett ed., 1997 & Supp. 
1999). 
 30. See Lawrence S. Liu, Taiwan (Republic of China), in WORLD ANTITRUST LAW AND 
PRACTICE: A COMPREHENSIVE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND BUSINESSES, supra note 29, § 37.8. 
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creation of monopolies and the lessening of competition. It empowers the 
TFTC to regulate “business combinations.”31 Under Section 26 of the 
TCA, a business combination may take any of the following forms: 
(1)  a merger between manufacturer and manufacturer, distributor and 
distributor, manufacturer and distributor, or service provider and 
service provider, which results in the continued existence of one 
business and the demise of another, or the establishment of a new 
business; 
(2)  the purchase of assets, whether in whole or in part, of another 
business to gain control over business management policy, supervision 
or administration; 
(3)  the purchase of shares, whether in whole or in part, of another 
business to gain control over business management policy, supervision 
or administration.32 
The Working Committee intended Section 26 of the TCA to apply only 
to large business combinations. Currently, there is no official threshold for 
what constitutes a “large” business combination, but if the Cabinet 
approves the TFTC’s criteria proposed in Section 25, then a “large” 
business combination will possess (1) more than a 33% market share, and 
(2) a combined sales volume of at least one billion Thai Baht.33 
E. Horizontal and Vertical Restraints 
Section 27 of the TCA prohibits the following horizontal and vertical 
restraints: 
(1) fixing the sales price of goods or services to be the same or at an 
agreed price, or limiting the sales volume of goods or services; 
(2) fixing the purchase price of goods or services to be the same or at 
an agreed price, or limiting the purchase volume of goods or services; 
(3) entering into an agreement to take over or control the market; 
(4) fixing agreements or conditions in a collusive manner to enable 
the other party to win a bid or tender for the sale of goods or services 
 31. Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 § 26 (1999) (Thail.). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See supra Part II.C. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p171 Thanitcul book pages.doc  10/14/02   4:37 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
178   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:171 
 
 
 
 
 
or to prevent the other party from competing in a bid or tender for the 
sale of goods or services; 
(5) allocating areas where each Business Operator may distribute or 
reduce the distribution of goods or services, or specifying customers to 
whom each Business Operator may distribute goods or services 
without competition from the other Business Operators; 
(6) allocating areas where each Business Operator may purchase 
goods or services, or specifying customers from whom the Business 
Operator may purchase goods or services; 
(7) fixing the volume of goods or services which each Business 
Operator may manufacture, purchase, distribute or provide in order to 
keep the volume less than the market demand; 
(8) lowering the quality of goods or services compared with the 
previous manufacture, distribution or provision, but maintaining or 
raising the price; 
(9) appointing or assigning a person as sole distributor or provider of 
the same type of category of goods or services; 
(10) fixing conditions or methods of practice in the purchase or 
distribution of goods or services to be of the same pattern or as agreed. 
In case business reasons necessitate any act under (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) or 
(10) in any certain period, the Business Operator shall file an application 
for permission with the Commission in accordance with Section 35.34 
The author is of the opinion that Section 27 is a mixture of South 
Korea’s prohibition of undue collaborative activities35 and Taiwan’s 
prohibition of non-price vertical restraints and exclusionary practices (i.e. 
territorial and customer restrictions).36 
F. Restrictions in International Agreements 
Section 28 of the TCA reflects certain Thailand-specific consumer 
traditions that were prevalent when the Working Committee drafted the 
TCA. During the period of economic growth, a small portion of the newly 
rich Thai wanted to buy luxurious German automobiles (especially 
 34. Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 § 27 (1999) (Thail.). 
 35. See generally Stanley P. Wagner, Antitrust, the Korean Experience 1981-85, 32 ANTITRUST 
BULLETIN 471, 471-522 (1987). 
 36. Liu, supra note 30, § 37.15. 
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Mercedes-Benz) directly from dealers in Germany. However, the German 
dealers were unable to sell the cars to Thai buyers because of dealer 
contracts that prohibited them from doing so. The corporate headquarters 
of Mercedes-Benz in Germany wanted Thai buyers to buy directly from 
dealers in Thailand. Hence, Section 28 of the TCA exists for the very 
specific purpose of forbidding Thai dealers from entering such contracts: 
A Business Operator having a business relationship, whether by 
contract, policy, partnership, shareholding, or any other relationship of 
like nature with a business operator outside [Thailand], is prohibited 
from performing any activity which will restrict the freedom of a 
person in [Thailand] desirous of purchasing goods or services for 
his/her own use, to purchase the goods or services directly from the 
business operator outside [Thailand].37 
Section 28 of the TCA differs from Article 32(1) of the MRFTA, 
which applies specifically to agreements or business dealings between 
Korean firms and foreign firms.38 Unfair trade practices in import agency 
agreements under Article 32(1) include: 
(1) unreasonably restricting the agent from handling competitive 
products; (2) imposing unreasonable requirements on the agent to 
purchase parts or supplies for the contract products from the foreign 
party or from a supplier designated by the foreign party; and (3) 
unreasonably restricting sales quantities or designating an 
unreasonably high minimum sales target.39 
In essence, Article 32(1) of the MRFTA aims to protect South Korean 
import agencies from unfair exploitation by foreign manufacturers while 
Section 28 of the TCA aims to enable wealthy Thai to buy luxurious 
automobiles directly from foreign dealers. 
G. Unfair Trade Practices 
The author is of the opinion that the Working Committee patterned 
Section 29 of the TCA after Article 24 of the Taiwanese FTL. Both 
contain a catchall rule prohibiting other methods of unfair competition.40 
In addition, both provide that firms may not engage in any act that 
 37. Id. § 28. 
 38. See Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act art. 32(1) (1999). 
 39. Chang, supra note 29, § 36.8. 
 40. Liu, supra note 30, § 37.16. 
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adversely affects orderly functioning of the markets. 
Section 29 of the TCA states: “A Business Operator is prohibited from 
performing any act contrary to free and fair competition and which results 
in the destruction, damage, obstruction, hindrance or restriction of the 
operations of other business operators, in order to prevent them from 
operating their business or cause the dissolution of their business.”41 
The South Korean MRFTA focuses primarily on regulating the 
behavior of the thirty largest Korean chaebols,42 but it also aims to 
regulate the unfair trade practices of a number of medium-sized firms. 
Article 23 of the MRFTA (Prohibition of Unfair Trade Practices) is 
patterned closely on the Japanese Antimonopoly Law. Between 1981 and 
1990, there were only eleven complaints of abuses of market dominant 
firms while there were 2,592 complaints against unfair trade practices.43 
One of the substantive flaws in the TCA lies in Section 29: it is too 
vague to be enforced. To remedy this flaw, the TFTC should adopt 
guidelines similar to the Japanese Fair Trade Commission’s (JFTC) 1982 
General Designations of Unfair Trade Methods. This would clarify for the 
Thai business community the types of business behavior that are 
anticompetitive and likely to violate Section 29. However, there is one 
legal obstacle to adopting similar guidelines: unlike Section 2(9) of the 
Japanese Antimonopoly Law, Section 29 of the TCA does not empower 
the TFTC to designate unfair business practices.44 
H. Special Issues Involving Intellectual Property Rights 
Industrial policies receive more attention in Japan and South Korea 
than they do in Thailand. Section 6 of the Antimonopoly Law and Articles 
23-25 of the MRFTA reflect the Japanese and South Korean governments’ 
great concerns over the importation of technology. Both governments set 
up screening schemes to eliminate unfair clauses contained in technology 
inducement contracts.45 The TCA, however, contains no similar provision, 
and Thailand benefits from its omission. Officials in charge of enforcing 
 41. Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 § 29 (1999) (Thail.). 
 42. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 43. KOREA FAIR TRADE COMM’N, COMPETITION POLICY IN KOREA: THE FIRST TEN YEARS 9-10 
(1992) (copy on file with the Washington University Global Studies Law Review). 
 44. Compare Antimonopoly Law § 2(9) with Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 § 29 (1999) 
(Thail.). 
 45. See SAKDA THANITCUL, INDUSTRIAL LADDER AND TECHNOLOGY IMPORT REGULATION: 
EXPERIENCES OF JAPAN, SOUTH KOREA, MEXICO, AND LESSONS FOR THAILAND 135-91 (Nititham 
Publ’g House 1999). 
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the TCA would encounter too many difficulties if they had to screen unfair 
clauses contained in technology importation agreements between Thai 
buyers and foreign technology suppliers. 
I. Other Exemptions 
Unlike the Antimonopoly Law,46 the TCA does not exempt the 
following activities from its purview: export/import transactions; export 
cartels; import cartels; depression cartels; small business cartels; and 
insurance. 
The lack of depression cartels and small business cartels led to 
criticism of the TCA by the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), the most 
powerful interest group in Thailand. The FTI strongly criticized the TCA 
on the grounds of its bad timing (each member of the FTI experienced 
serious difficulties after the 1997 economic collapse), lack of safeguard 
measures, and substantial restriction of the Thai government’s current 
policy of promoting SMEs. 
III. ENFORCEMENT 
A. The Thai Fair Trade Commission 
The TFTC is the only administrative agency in Thailand with direct 
enforcement authority over the TCA. The Public Prosecutor’s office holds 
certain functions in the enforcement scheme as well, but these functions 
are narrowly drawn. 
The TFTC is composed of the Minister of Commerce (who serves as 
Chairman), the Permanent Secretary for Commerce (who serves as Vice 
Chairman), the Permanent Secretary for Finance, and between eight and 
twelve experts appointed by the Cabinet to serve as commission members. 
The Cabinet must appoint at least half of the experts from the private 
sector, and they must have knowledge and experience in law, economics, 
commerce, business management, or government administration. 
Currently, the TFTC is composed of sixteen members, with three 
representing the FTI and three representing the Thai Chamber of 
Commerce. This gets to the heart of the TFTC’s serious flaws: (1) there 
are too many TFTC members; (2) many of the members are not qualified 
competition law experts; (3) the members only work on a part-time basis 
 46. MITSUO MATSUSHITA & JOHN D. DAVIS, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY 
LAW 88-94 (1990). 
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and convene only two meetings every eight months; (4) there is a vast 
overrepresentation of the private sector; (5) TFTC members receive an 
extremely low level of compensation; (6) there are no rules regarding how 
proceedings are conducted; and (7) the TFTC has weak administrative and 
secretariat support.47 
The Office of the TFTC is anchored in the DIT within the MOC. The 
director-general of the DIT is the secretary-general, in charge of the 
performance of the Office. The Office of the TFTC has a few serious 
flaws. First, there are only about forty-five officials who work within the 
Office, all of whom were transferred from the DIT while they were still 
government officials. The TFTC is supposed to be independent, but the 
Office and its staff are an administrative agency and therefore not 
independent. Second, the mentality of the officials in the Office cannot 
switch from market intervention to market promotion automatically. Most 
of them enforced both the PFA and TCA before their transfer to the Office 
of the TFTC. In addition, most are unfamiliar with the concept of 
competition law and never received adequate training. Third, there are no 
formal hearing or investigative procedures that the officials can follow. 
The composition of the TFTC and its weak secretariat and 
administrative support make enforcement of the TCA ineffective. The 
decision making process is extremely long while the actual decisions are 
extremely short and provide almost no explicatory rationale. 
B. Sanctions 
Section 51 of the TCA appears to follow the pattern of the Taiwanese 
FTL.48 The TFTC may impose a maximum three-year term of 
imprisonment, or a criminal fine of up to six million Thai Baht 
(approximately equal to US$120,000), or both for either any violation of 
Sections 25 through 29 of the TCA or a failure to comply with Section 39. 
The serious flaw with the penal provisions of the TCA is that the TFTC 
may impose a maximum three-year term of imprisonment for either failing 
to apply to the TFTC for permission to merge businesses49 or violating the 
unfair trade practices provision.50 The TFTC should punish violators of 
these particular provisions with nothing more than monetary fines. 
 47. See Nipon Poapongsakorn, Kodmai Kaengkan Tang Kanka: Naewtang Karnpattana Bangkab 
Chay Kodmai [Competition Law: Ways to Develop Its Enforcement] 1-6 (July 12, 2000) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
 48. See Liu, supra note 30, § 37.7.4. 
 49. See supra Part II.D. 
 
 50. See supra Part II.G. 
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C. TFTC Enforcement Procedure 
Any person who discovers a violation of the TCA may report it to the 
Office of the TFTC. The secretariat of the Office of the TFTC conducts 
investigations, but if necessary, designated staff members may take 
appropriate measures, including collecting information from the alleged 
violator’s business premises or summoning the parties for an investigative 
hearing.51 
Japan’s enforcement procedure is well developed and is quite similar to 
a court proceeding.52 In contrast, Thailand’s enforcement procedure is still 
in the early stages of development. Although Sections 8(11) and 8(12) 
empower the TFTC to prescribe enforcement procedure, the TFTC has 
made no progress in doing so.53 
IV. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The Office of the TFTC currently employs independent researchers for 
four specific research projects: 
(1) Research on the one hundred most important products in the 
domestic market in order to build a database necessary to enforce the 
TCA; 
(2) Research on unfair trade practices in order to clarify the vague 
wording of the catchall provision of TCA Section 29; 
(3) Research on independent agencies in order to change the legal 
status of the Office from an administrative agency closely associated 
with the MOC to an independent agency like its counterparts in Japan, 
South Korea, and Taiwan; 
(4) Research on business practices in Thai industries in order to 
identify business practices that might violate the TCA.54 
 51. Trade Competition Act B.E. 2542 § 19 (1999) (Thail.). 
 52. MATSUSHITA & DAVIS, supra note 46, at 81-83. 
 53. See Poapongsakorn, supra note 47, at 5. 
 54. See Department of Internal Trade, Summary of the Work on the Trade Competition Act, 
available at http://www.dit.go.th/english (last visited May 20, 2002). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The purposes of the TCA are to prevent monopolization and the 
reduction or limitation of competition in business operations. 
Unfortunately, the TFTC’s enforcement of the TCA has been rather 
disappointing. A wrong design of the substantive provisions (primarily an 
overemphasis on monopoly and the abuse of a dominant position), a poor 
institutional design (i.e. too many members of TFTC with a lack of 
experience), weak secretariat support, the lack of well developed 
procedural rules, and imprisonment for all violations regardless of their 
seriousness all have contributed to the TFTC’s lack of success. However, 
the secretariat’s recent action to obtain its budget from the Thai 
government and subsequently spend a substantial portion of it to 
commission independent research is a good sign. The knowledge and 
experiences of many advanced industrial countries on how they deal with 
similar problems certainly will prove helpful for Thailand. 
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